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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of the language used that Section 337 was intended to protect the
publication of all fair and true reports whether published maliciously
or not, it is submitted that such an intendment is contrary to all
principles of justice and decency, and should not be attributed to the
legislature. Such an interpretation would make it possible for a
malevolent judge to include harsh, sarcastic, and irrelevant defama-
tory matter in a judicial opinion and forward copies to the daily press
and periodicals of general circulation. However true it may be that
the public is entitled to know all matters of public interest, the posi-
tion that a statute could be intended to protect startling vituperation
and railing denunciation is untenable. Censure or removal of a judge
would appear to be inadequate for conduct so malicious, resulting in
great harm to individual reputation.
Although the Pette case decides that Section 337 would protect
a judge who affirmatively acts to publish his own opinions, it is sub-
mitted that with regard to strictly unofficial publications, the require-
ment of freedom from actual malice should attach.
With such a qualification, the Pette case is undoubtedly correct
in according the protection of Section 337 to a judge in the same man-
ner as to any other individual. To further clarify the issue, it is
suggested that the New York Law Journal and the New York Sup-
plement be accorded the judicial status which they so justly deserve.
It cannot be doubted that they both form a constituent part of the
judicial process, being cited by attorneys and judges and circulating
valuable legal information to members of the legal profession.
X
TORTS - LAST CLEAR CHANCE - DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE RE-
QUtRED.-Deceased, having negligently entered a subway tunnel, was
struck by a train of the defendant six hundred feet from the nearest
station. The train was stopped three times by the release of an emer-
gency brake before an investigation was conducted which revealed
the body. One of several ways that this brake could be actuated was
by a mechanism, suspended before each car, striking an object on the
tracks. The Court of Appeals, in granting a new trial, held that
the doctrine of last clear chance was applicable since defendant had
knowledge of facts from which he could have deduced possible dan-
ger, and yet failed to take appropriate action. Kitmkumian v. City
of New York, 305 N. Y. 167, 111 N. E. 2d 865 (1953).
Under the doctrine of last clear chance an injured plaintiff, al-
though his contributory negligence placed him in a position of peril,'
' See Mast v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 79 F. Supp. 149, 160 (N. D. Iowa 1948),
aff'd, 176 F. 2d 157 (8th Cir. 1949); Lee v. Pennsylvania R. R., 269 N. Y.
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may recover from a negligent defendant who had knowledge of that
peril.2 Where the defendant has failed to exercise reasonable care
to avoid the accident,3 although he had a last clear opportunity to do
so,4 his negligence is deemed the proximate cause of the injury.
Under such circumstances, the negligence of the plaintiff is considered
remote.5 In some jurisdictions, the application of last clear chance
is limited strictly to situations in which the defendant had actual
knowledge of the danger to the plaintiff.6 In others, it is sufficient
if the defendant had constructive knowledge ' of the fact that the
injured person, although not yet in danger, was placing himself in
peril.8  The majority view, 9 however, is between these two extremes.
To determine the requisite of knowledge in these jurisdictions, an
objective test is applied-namely, that the defendant could have dis-
covered the danger to the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable care.' °
Until recently, New York had required actual knowledge on the
part of the defendant" as a prerequisite to the application of last
53, 55, 198 N. E. 629, 630 (1935) ; Selinsky v. Olsen, 38 Cal. 2d 102, 237 P. 2d
645, 646-647 (1951) ; Lund v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 25 Cal. 2d 287, 153 P. 2d 705,
710 (1944). The defense of contributory negligence dates back to the early
English case of Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K. B.
1809).
2 Storr v. New York Cent. R. R., 261 N. Y. 348, 185 N. E. 407 (1933);
Dulemba v. Tribble, 325 Mich. 143, 37 N. W. 2d 894 (1949); see Jerrell v.
New York Cent. R. R., 68 F. 2d 856 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 646
(1934).
3 Nielsen v. Richman, 68 S. D. 104, 299 N. W. 74 (1941) ; see Caplan v.
Arndt, 123 Conn. 585, 196 Atl. 631, 633 (1938).
4 United States v. Morow, 182 F. 2d 986 (D. C. Cir. 1950); Snyder v.
Union Ry., 234 App. Div. 320, 255 N. Y. Supp. 155 (1st Dep't 1932); see
Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36, 297 Pac. 884, 888 (1931).
5 See Rider v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Ry., 171 N. Y. 139, 147, 63 N. E.
836, 838 (1902); Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109, 84 At. 301, 305
(1912).6 Hamlin v. Roundy, 96 N. H. 123, 71 A. 2d 419 (1950); Rew v. Dorn,
160 Ore. 368, 85 P. 2d 1031 (1938).
7 Smith v. Gould, 110 W. Va. 579, 159 S. E. 53 (1931).
8 Perkins v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 340 Mo. 868, 102 S. W.
2d 915 (1937); see Coulson, Last Clear Chance-Huntnitarian. Doctrine in
Missouri, 6 KAN. CITY L. REv. 235, for a discussion of the humanitarian doc-
trine in Missouri and the extreme situations to which it has been extended.
9 See Note, 92 A. L. R. 47, 149 (1934).
10 Puerto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Miranda, 62 F. 2d 479 (1st Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 731 (1933); see Kansas City Southern Ry. v.
Ellzey, 275 U. S. 236, 241 (1927) ; Doolan v. Werner, 130 Conn. 394, 34 A. 2d
731 (1943); Ward v. City Fuel Oil Co., 147 Fla. 320, 2 So. 2d 586, 587
(1941) ; Floeck v. Hoover, 52 N. M. 193, 195 P. 2d 86, 87 (1948) ; Virginia
Ry. & Power Co. v. Smith & Hicks, Inc., 129 Va. 269, 105 S. E. 532, 534
(1921). In these jurisdictions the doctrine is not applied to situations in which
the negligence of the plaintiff continues up to the time of the accident (as
where he also had constructive knowledge of the danger) since such negligence
cannot be considered remote; this is the major difference between these juris-
dictions and those which follow the humanitarian doctrine. See Coulson, supra
note 8 at 245.
"'Hernandez v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp., 284 N. Y. 535, 32
1953 ]
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clear chance. However, in Woloszynowski v. New York Cent.
R. R.,1 2 Judge Cardozo initiated a trend toward a more liberal ap-
plication of the doctrine by language implying that a defendant might
possibly be held liable although he did not have actual knowledge of
the peril.13 Then the court in Elliott v. New York Rapid Transit
Corp.14 indicated that a defendant might be charged with the knowl-
edge of danger which a reasonable man would infer from the facts
brought to his attention.15 Later, in Chadwick v. City of New York,16
it was held unnecessary that a defendant have knowledge of the dan-
ger to the particular individual injured if he in fact knew that some-
one was in peril.1 7
The most recent extension of the doctrine appears in the prin-
cipal case. The Appellate Division,' 8 applying the law as heretofore
existing in New York, held that the facts known to the defendant,
namely, that the emergency brake had twice automatically operated,
were insufficient in law to support an inference of actual knowledge
that someone was in peril.19 In reversing a dismissal of the com-
plaint,20 the Court of Appeals held the doctrine of last clear chance
applicable. In so doing, they stated that it was a question of fact
whether the failure to investigate after the second stop constituted
"negligence so reckless as to betoken indifference to knowledge." 21
In New York then, the requirement of knowledge is now sat-
isfied by proof that the defendant had knowledge only of facts from
N. E. 2d 542 (1940); Panarese v. Union Ry., 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 84(1933); Storr v. New York Cent. R. L, 261 N. Y. 348, 185 N. E. 407 (1933);
Wright v. Union Ry., 224 App. Div. 55, 229 N. Y. Supp. 162 (1st Dep't),
aff'd mem., 250 N. Y. 526, 166 N. E. 310 (1928); see Srogi v. New York Cent.
R. R., 247 App. Div. 95, 96, 286 N. Y. Supp. 215, 217 (4th Dep't 1936).
12254 N. Y. 206, 172 N. E. 471 (1930).
13 "... [Blut knowledge there must be, or negligence so reckless as to
betoken indifference to knowledge." Id. at 209, 172 N. E. at 472.
14293 N. Y. 145, 56 N. E. 2d 86 (1944).
'5 ,,... [T]he jury could have found that Dingle did not exercise due care
when he failed to pull the emergency brake cord while the train moved fifty-
three feet during which the deceased was immediately before him in a position
of peril." Id. at 149-150, 56 N. E. 2d at 88.16301 N. Y. 176, 93 N. E. 2d 625 (1950).
17". ... [I]t may not be categorically stated that its [last clear chance]
applicability is limited to situations where a defendant has precise knowledge
of both the exact nature of the danger and of the particular individual threatened
so long as there is proof to support an inference that someone is in peril."
Id. at 181, 93 N. E. 2d at 628.
18280 App. Div. 32, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 395 (1st Dep't 1952).19 Id. at 34, 111 N. Y. S. 2d at 396. The court reasoned that there were
several ways in which such brake could have been actuated, none of which
would reasonably indicate danger to anyone, particularly considering the posi-
tion of the train when stopped, which rendered it even more unlikely that the
defendant had knowledge of danger to anyone.
20 In the court below, although a verdict was directed for the defendant,
the court overruled a motion of the defendant to dismiss the complaint.21305 N. Y. at 175, 111 N. E. 2d at 869.
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which a reasonable man would infer possible danger. This interpre-
tation of last clear chance is but one step from the majority view-
that if an ordinary prudent man would have discovered the danger,
regardless of the facts actually known, there is sufficient knowledge
to satisfy the requirements of the doctrine. It would seem that the
ultimate result of the present trend will be the application, in those
cases otherwise within the scope of the doctrine, of a purely objective
test of knowledge.
Some will argue that further extensions of the doctrine of last
clear chance will culminate in completely obviating the defense of
contributory negligence. 22 However, if the doctrine is viewed as a
facet of the theory of proximate causation, it automatically limits it-
self to situations in which the negligence of the plaintiff can be said
to be remote.2 3 It is submitted that the more liberal application of
the last clear chance doctrine in New York reflects a more humane
attitude on the part of the courts which is wholly consistent with the
present trend toward "plaintiff-mindedness." The courts are obvi-
ously attempting to ameliorate the harshness of the defense of con-
tributory negligence by extending the application of the doctrine of
last clear chance. This would be rendered to a great degree unneces-
sary if the doctrine of comparative negligence, which is in itself an
ameliorating doctrine,24 were adopted in this jurisdiction. 25
WILLs-REvocATIoN BY AFTER-BORN CHILD-INSURANCE POL-
IcY "SETTLEMENT" WITHIN MEANING OF STATUTE.-Pursuant to
Section 26 of the Decedent Estate Law, plaintiff sought, as an after-
born child, to recover her intestate share from her father's estate.
Prior to her birth, plaintiff's father executed a will, establishing a
trust for her mother and sister but making no mention of, or pro-
vision for, plaintiff. Subsequently, he made plaintiff co-beneficiary
of several insurance policies. On appeal, the Court held that the
testator's designation of plaintiff as co-beneficiary of the insurance
policies was a settlement under Section 26, precluding her from tak-
ing her intestate share as against her father's will. Matter of Faber,
305 N. Y. 200, 111 N. E. 2d 883 (1953).
At English common law, a will was presumably revoked by a
subsequent marriage and birth of issue.1  However, mere birth of
issue alone, where a marriage existed at the time of the execution of
22 See Panarese v. Union Ry., 261 N. Y. 233, 238, 185 N. E. 84, 86 (1933).
23 Rider v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Ry., 171 N. Y. 139, 63 N. E. 836
(1902) ; Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109, 84 Atl. 301 (1912).24 See Steam Dredge No. 1, 134 Fed. 161, 168 (1st Cir. 1904).
25 See Note, 27 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 303 (1953).
2 For a discussion of the common law, see Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns.
Ch. 506, 510-16 (N. Y. 1820).
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